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THEORETICAL STRUCTURES AND THE MICRO-MACRO PROBLEM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The two par t s i n t o which the present volume is d i v i d ed bear 
a mis l ead ing resemblance to the common d i s t i n c t i o n between mic ro -
and mac rosoc i o l o g y—a resemblance so mis l ead ing tha t i t c a l l s f o r 
some comment. The resemblance is mis l ead ing because the volume 
is a c o l l e c t i o n o f t h e o r i e s . Theor i es are abs t r a c t and g e n e r a l . 
Because they are abs t r a c t and g e n e r a l , they have m u l t i p l e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . And many, though not a l l , m u l t i p l y 
i n t e r p r e t a b l e t h e o r i e s are capable o f a p p l i c a t i o n s to both mic ro -
and mac rosoc i o l o g y . True, not a l l the t h e o r i e s in the present 
volume are pure abs t r a c t s t r u c t u r e s . Many, in f a c t , are g i ven 
p a r t i c u l a r , c onc r e t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Thus, S t r y k e r ' s paper on 
i d e n t i t y ( ch . 2 ) i s app l i ed t o i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s , 
Hannan's paper on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e co l ogy ( ch . 14) is app l i ed to 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s and t h e i r env ironments . By c o n t r a s t , W i l i e r et 
a l ' s paper on networks of power ( ch . 12) is a pure ly a b s t r a c t , 
g enera l t h e o r y . I t a p p l i e s t o " a c t o r s " and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . I t 
is in some sense an " i n t e r a c t o r " t h e o r y , but the a c t o r s might be 
i n d i v i d u a l s , f o rma l i z ed p o s i t i o n s in an o r g a n i z a t i o n , 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s as a whole , or even n a t i o n - s t a t e s . I n s o f a r as a 
theo ry ( i n t e r a c t o r o r n o t ) i s abs t rac t and g e n e r a l , i t i s n e i t h e r 
mic ro - nor m a c r o s o c i o l o g y . I t i s on ly the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f a 
theory tha t are micro or macro. The d i v i s i o n of the present 
volume i n t o par t s is not a d i v i s i o n i n t o micro and macro, because 
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the r e are abs t r a c t t h e o r i e s in both p a r t s . And even where the 
t h e o r i e s have p a r t i c u l a r micro or macro i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s they hav 
in most cases an under ly ing t h e o r e t i c a l s t ruc tu r e admit t ing 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a t o ther " l e v e l s . " 
M u l t i p l e i n t e r p r e t a b i l i t y i s a p roper ty o f a l l abs t rac t 
t h e o r i e s . I t is in a sense what " a b s t r a c t " and " g e n e r a l " mean. 
However, we do not c la im that a l l t h e o r i e s are t h e r e f o r e capable 
of a p p l i c a t i o n to both micro - and macrophenomena. Hannan's 
populat ion e co l o gy o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s i s m u l t i p l y i n t e r p r e t a b l e 
theory w i th , f o r example, a p p l i c a t i o n a l so t o e thn ic c o n f l i c t 
(Hannan, 1979). But, because o f i t s under ly ing s t r u c t u r e , i t i s 
u n l i k e l y to have any m i c r o a p p l i c a t i o n . I t has no a c t o r s . I t i s 
a mis take , however , to o v e r - g e n e r a l i z e t h i s kind of example. 
Though some abs t rac t t h e o r i e s are not capable of a p p l i c a t i o n to 
both mic ro - and macrophenomena, the re is at l e a s t one ve ry l a r g e 
c l a s s o f t h e o r i e s , i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s , which i s . 
Not that the r e are no d i f f e r e n c e s between mic ro - and 
mac roapp l i c a t i ons . However one d e f i n e s micro/macro, whether as 
s c a l e , l e v e l , o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n , o r kind o f a c t o r , the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between micro - and macroapp l i ca t i on are pro found. 
But they are not d i f f e r e n c e s between q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t 
kinds o f t h e o r y . The d i f f e r e n c e s are a n a l y t i c , they are caused 
by v a r i a b l e s in or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a t h e o r y . Ne i ther g i v e s 
r i s e to c o n c r e t e l y d i f f e r e n t kinds o f t h e o r y , one o f which i s 
" m i c r o , " the other "macro . " S ca l e , l e v e l , and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n are a l l v a r i a b l e s ; i n d i v i d u a l s , f o rma l i z ed 
p o s i t i o n s , o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and n a t i o n - s t a t e s are a l l d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the un i t s o f a t h e o r y . The d i f f e r e n c e s to 
which they g i v e r i s e are impor tant , but they are d i f f e r e n c e s 
w i t h i n , not between t h e o r i e s . 
The micro/macro problem has r e c e n t l y a t t r a c t e d a good deal 
o f a t t e n t i o n . (See Alexander et a l , 1987; Coleman, 1986; 
C o l l i n s , 1981; Fine and Kleinman, 1983; Knorr -Cer t ina and 
C i c o u r e l , 1981; R i t z e r , 1985.) Understood as " l e v e l s , " the 
e f f o r t to s o l v e the problem has led to a p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f 
d i s t i n c t i o n s , adding "meso" (Maines, 1979) and "mega" (Jones , 
1988) to micro and macro. The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of l e v e l s r e v e a l s a 
good deal about what is wrong in t h i s deba te . I t c o n t i n u a l l y 
w a f f l e s between t r e a t i n g the i ssue as a n a l y t i c ( f o r example, 
Alexander et al , 1987), which promises some so r t of s o l u t i o n , and 
t r e a t i n g " l e v e l s " a s i f they were o n t o l o g i c a l r e a l i t i e s (Maines , 
1979; Jones, 1988), which promises only a dead end. The i ssues 
become c l e a r e r , we b e l i e v e , i f one examines more c l o s e l y the 
s t ruc tu r e o f m u l t i p l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s , which i s 
one of the tasks we undertake in the present i n t r o d u c t i o n . 
I n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s d e s c r i b e i n t e r a c t i o n in systems o f 
a c t o r s tha t occur with s i t u a t i o n s tha t are a t l e a s t p a r t l y , 
though usua l l y not w h o l l y , governed by p r e - g i v e n s o c i a l 
frameworks. Though they are " m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y s i t u a t i o n a l i s t " 
(Knor r -Ce t ina and C i c o u r e l , 1981), they are o f t e n taken to be 
" m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t " by h o l i s t s . For t h i s reason, 
h o l i s t s o b j e c t even to macroapp l i ca t i ons o f such t h e o r i e s as 
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being "m ic ro " because, though they might not be i n t e r p e r s o n a l , 
they are s t i l l i n t e r a c t o r ; though the a c t o r s might not be 
i n d i v i d u a l s , they s t i l l have agency; and though the a c t i on is 
s i tua t ed in s t r u c t u r e s , the ac t o r s s t i l l a c t . From t h i s 
v i e w p o i n t , the a p p l i c a t i o n o f , say , Emerson's power-dependence 
theo ry (Emerson, 1962, 1972a, 1972b) to i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s i s " r e d u c t i o n . " But, except a s r i t u a l , i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to misuse the concept of r educt ion in t h i s way. (On r educ t i on , 
f o r example, see Nage l , 1962; or Webster , 1973). I t is an 
a t t i t u d e tha t on ly g e t s in the way of the more p r a c t i c a l purpose 
o f understanding s c a l e , l e v e l , and s t ruc tu r e as a n a l y t i c aspects 
o f t h e o r i e s . 
This argument holds no matter what meaning one g i v e s to 
"micro/macro" in the t e c h n i c a l , as d i s t i n c t from m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l , 
sense , whether s m a l l / l a r g e , ac tor/sys tem, a c t i o n / s t r u c t u r e , or 
i n d i v i d u a l ac tor/group a c t o r . But one o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the 
problem is the tendency to t r e a t a l l these meanings as i f they 
were c o r r e l a t e d when in f a c t they can be independent . In the 
present chapter we use the terms in t h e i r s imp les t meaning, 
s c a l e . This makes i t p a r t i c u l a r l y easy to see the a n a l y t i c , as 
opposed to c o n c r e t e , nature of the micro/macro d i s t i n c t i o n . But 
we could e q u a l l y we l l have taken l e v e l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n , or 
nature of the ac to r as a s t a r t i n g po in t f o r the same argument. 
The present chapter i s d i v i d ed i n t o th r ee par ts that 
correspond to th ree bas i c theses o f t h i s argument. The f i r s t 
par t deve l ops f u r t h e r the c la im tha t the micro/macro d i s t i n c t i o n 
i s pure ly a n a l y t i c , a v a r i a b l e in or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a theo ry 
ra the r than a d i f f e r e n c e between t h e o r i e s . The second part 
deve l ops f u r t h e r the c la im that t h e o r i e s , because they are 
abs t r a c t and g e n e r a l , are in themselves n e i t h e r micro nor macro, 
i t is on ly t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n s tha t may be micro or macro. To do 
t h i s , i t b r i e f l y s tud i e s two a p p l i c a t i o n s , one micro and the 
o ther macro, that have a common under ly ing t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e . 
The t h i r d part f u r t h e r deve lops the c la im that the r e is a v e ry 
l a r g e c l a s s o f t h e o r i e s , i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s , capable o f 
a p p l i c a t i o n to both mic ro - and m a c r o s o c i o l o g i c a l phenomena. I t 
ana lyzes the e l ements , p rocesses , and f e a t u r e s o f t h i s c l a s s o f 
t h e o r i e s , a c l a s s to which many, though not a l l , o f the papers in 
the present volume be l ong . 
I I . MICRO, MESO, MACRO, MEGA. 
The s imp l es t meaning o f "m ic ro " versus "macro" is " s m a l l " 
versus " l a r g e . " I t is not c l e a r how anyone could ever have 
en t e r t a in ed the idea tha t s ca l e g i v e s r i s e t o q u a l i t a t i v e l y 
d i f f e r e n t kinds of t h e o r y . Sca le has no natura l break at which 
micro becomes r e a d i l y d i s t i n gu i shed from macro, and d i f f e r e n c e s 
in s c a l e are as important at the small as at any o ther par t of 
the s c a l e . S o c i a l l y , the d i f f e r e n c e between two and th r ee a c t o r s 
is p o s s i b l y the most important break in the c o n t i n u i t y o f the 
natura l numbers and c e r t a i n l y more s i g n i f i c a n t than the break 
between, say , ten and e l e v e n , or f i f t y and f i f t y - o n e , or one 
hundred and one-hundred-and-one a c t o r s , where one might more 
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n a t u r a l l y look f o r a d i s t i n c t i o n between micro and macro. The 
d i f f e r e n c e s are again l a r g e at the l a r g e r end o f the s c a l e , where 
the d i f f e r e n c e between, say , a town of 5,000 people and a c i t y of 
500,000 peop le is v e r y l a r g e , even though both are presumably 
macro. Sca le may be lumpy, but i t is s t i l l a continuum. 
At f i r s t s i g h t , l e v e l s seem to imply something both more 
d i scont inuous and more c o n c r e t e l y " r e a l . " But what are the 
l e v e l s in the a n a l y s i s o f con juga l power s t ruc tu re? I f Dick and 
Jane are mar r i ed , both employed (by d i f f e r e n t emp loye r s ) , and 
l i v e in a neighbood of a c i t y in the Eastern part of the United 
S t a t e s , then i n d i v i d u a l s , f a m i l y , ne ighborhood, c i t y , r e g i o n , and 
nat ion may a l l p lay a r o l e in the ana l y s i s o f the d i v i s i o n o f 
powers between Dick and Jane. But f i rm and indus t ry probably are 
not among the r e l e v a n t l e v e l s . I ns t ead , they are l i k e l y to 
appear in the a n a l y s i s as a t t r i b u t e s of the two a c t o r s . On the 
o ther hand, what are the l e v e l s in the a n a l y s i s o f s o c i a l 
m o b i l i t y ? Now f i rm and indus t ry are important l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s 
but neighborhood is probably no t . The l e v e l s , in o ther words, 
are a b s t r a c t i o n s which s h i f t with the purpose o f the o b s e r v e r . 
In any case , t h e r e is no natura l break in them that c l e a r l y 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s micro from macro. I t i s t h i s a n a l y t i c , as opposed 
t o c o n c r e t e , nature o f l e v e l s that has g i ven r i s e t o t h e i r 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n i n t o m ic ro , macro, then meso (Maines , 1979), and 
now mega ( Jones , 1988). In some sense they are a l l r e a l , but it 
i s the phenomenal world tha t i s c o n c r e t e , not the " l e v e l s " 
abs t rac ted by the o b s e r v e r . In p a r t i c u l a r , n e i t h e r the 
i n d i v i d u a l s nor any of the h igher l e v e l s are more r e a l than any 
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other o f the o b s e r v e r ' s a b s t r a c t i o n s . C o l l i n s ' (1981) argument 
that m i c r o r e l a t i o n s are the foundat ions o f macrosoc i o l ogy because 
encounters are what the observer a c t u a l l y observes and a l l the 
r e s t i s cons t ruc ted by the observer is not a t enab l e p o s i t i o n , 
because the micro world is no l e s s obse r v e r - c ons t ruc t ed than the 
macro wor ld . 
The problem of s t r u c t u r e / a c t i o n is more s u b t l e , e s p e c i a l l y 
because i t i s more d i f f i c u l t t o separate t e c h n i c a l from 
m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s . Some t h e o r e t i c a l s t r a t e g i e s go so f a r as 
to i n s i s t that a l l behav ior s imply emanates from p r e - g i v e n 
s t ruc tu r e ( as Meyer does in Meyer et a l , 1987). Others i n s i s t 
that no behav ior a t a l l i s p r e - g i v e n : Because s t ruc tu r e i s 
open - t ex tu r ed , incomp le t e , cannot guarantee i t s own a p p l i c a t i o n , 
a l l behav ior i s a c t i o n , has agency ( G a r f i n k e l , 1964). Ne i ther 
p o s i t i o n i s t e n a b l e : I f one adopts the v iew tha t th e r e i s no 
p r e - g i v en s t r u c t u r e , one cannot even analyze the "background 
e x p e c t a n c i e s " that f i g u r e s o l a r g e l y i n G a r f i n k e l ' s a n a l y s i s . I f 
one adopts the v iew that the r e i s on ly p r e - g i v en s t r u c t u r e , i t 
becomes d i f f i c u l t i f not imposs ib l e t o understand change. But i f 
one adopts the p o s i t i o n tha t s t ruc tu r e too is a v a r i a b l e , tha t 
i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n v a r i e s from s i t u a t i o n t o s i t u a t i o n , but 
most s i t u a t i o n s combine s t ruc tu re with a c t i o n , i t becomes 
d i f f i c u l t to i d e n t i f y s t r u c t u r e with macro and ac t i on with 
m i c r o s o c i o l o g y . 
Thus, the arguments that "m ic ro " and "macro" are a n a l y t i c 
d i s t i n c t i o n s , not c onc re t e r e a l i t i e s , does not depend on the 
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meaning one g i v e s to the terms. However, part of the micro/macro 
problem a r i s e s from the t r e a t i n g a l l th ree as a s i n g l e d ichotomy. 
I t i s o f t e n assumed tha t s c a l e , l e v e l , and s t ruc tu r e are somehow 
i n t e r c o r r e l a t e d , g i v i n g "m i c ro " the meaning o f sma l l , 
unstructured systems o f ac t i on whi l e "macro" means l a r g e , 
s t ruc tured systems without a c t i o n . But i t i s j u s t as obv ious 
tha t they can be uncor r e l a t ed as i t is tha t they can be a n a l y t i c . 
The number of l e v e l s sometimes i n c r ease s as the s i z e of a 
system i n c r e a s e s , but even the sma l l es t system has at l e a s t two 
l e v e l s , a c to r and system. I t i s p o s s i b l e to equate micro with 
ac tor and macro with system, i f c o n s i s t e n t l y a p p l i e d . One then 
has a v iew tha t e v e r y theo ry has both a micro and macro aspec t , 
and s o l v e s the micro/macro problem by r e l a t i n g ac tor to system. 
But t h i s has nothing to do with s c a l e . I t is c e r t a i n l y not what 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s i n t e r personal from i n t e r - n a t i o n c o n f l i c t o r 
con juga l power from wor ld-system dependency r e l a t i o n s . 
Nor is s ca l e n e c e s s a r i l y c o r r e l a t e d with s t r u c t u r e . Many 
s o c i o l o g i s t s focus i n c r e a s i n g l y on s t ruc tu r e as s i z e o f system 
i n c r e a s e s , but even the sma l l e s t system has s t ruc tu r e and even 
the l a r g e s t has a c t i o n . The l a t t e r po in t i s sometimes obscured 
by equat ing " s t r u c t u r e " , not with p r e - g i v en s o c i a l framework, but 
with s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l " f o r c e s . " The outcomes o f a c t i on are o f t e n 
unintended; even when r ecogn i zed they are o f t e n beyond the 
c o n t r o l o f any i n d i v i d u a l ; and t h i s is e s p e c i a l l y no t i c ed by 
s o c i o l o g i s t s in l a r g e - s c a l e systems. But t h i s is not a matter o f 
i nc r eas ing amounts o f s t r u c t u r e . "Macro" outcomes are s t i l l 
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outcomes o f a c t i o n s . " S t r u c t u r e " i s g i ven to ac t i on by p r e - g i v e n 
s o c i a l frameworks. Just as with l e v e l s , one could cons t ruc t a 
c o n s i s t e n t theo ry of m ic ro - and m a c r o - r e l a t i o n s around the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between s t ruc tu r e and a c t i o n , but again the problem 
would be to r e l a t e s t ruc tu r e to ac t i on w i th in a t h e o r y . I t would 
not g i v e r i s e t o d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s . 
C o r r e l a t i n g s c a l e with s t ruc tu r e has been l e s s mis l ead ing 
than c o r r e l a t i n g i t with l e v e l s because d i s cuss i ons o f l e v e l s 
seldom r id themse lves o f the p resuppos i t i on that l e v e l s are not 
s imply a n a l y t i c , they are o n t o l o g i c a l l y r e a l . I f l e v e l s are 
r e i f i e d , one i s l e f t with on ly th ree o p t i o n s : Treat theo ry a t 
each l e v e l as independent , reduce one theo ry to the o t h e r , or 
i n t e r r e l a t e them. A l l o f these have been t r i e d , r e p e a t e d l y : 
Independence by Durkheim (1951/1897) and Parsons (Parsons and 
S h i l s , 1951) among o t h e r s ; r educ t i on to m i c r o s o c i o l o g y by Homans 
(1964 ) , C o l l i n s (1981 ) , Denzen (1987 ) , Fine and Kleinman (1983 ) , 
and Knor r -Cer t ina ( 1981 ) ; and to macrosoc i o l ogy by A l thusser 
(1971) and Meyer et al ( 1987 ) ; as we l l as numerous syn theses , f o r 
example by Alexander ( 1987 ) , Coleman ( 1986 ) , Giddens ( 1979 ) , and 
R i t z e r ( 1985 ) . But none has l a i d the problem to r e s t . They have 
not l a i d the problem to r e s t because, l i k e the mind/body problem, 
the c a t e g o r i e s in terms of which we have come to th ink about the 
problem f o r c e us i n t o asking f r u i t l e s s ques t i ons about i t . I f 
l e v e l s are independent , they g i v e r i s e to two separate kinds o f 
t h e o r y , one micro and the other macro. But n e i t h e r s c a l e nor 
l e v e l g i v e r i s e t o q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t kinds o f t h e o r y . I f 
they are not independent , p o s s i b l y one i s r e d u c i b l e to the o t h e r . 
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But no one has been ab le to accomplish the r educ t i on (Webs te r , 
1973)• I f the l e v e l s are ne i the r independent nor r e d u c i b l e , the 
on ly s o l u t i o n i s s y n t h e s i s . But even syn thes i s o f t e n s t i l l 
c once i v e s o f l e v e l s as conc re t e " p a r t s " t o be r e l a t e d . 1 
Our conc lus ion up to t h i s po int is tha t s c a l e , l e v e l , and 
s t r u c t u r e are v a r i a b l e s i n , not d i f f e r e n c e s between, t h e o r i e s . 
Do the same arguments hold f o r the d i f f e r e n c e between i n d i v i d u a l 
and co rpo ra t e ac to rs? I n d i v i d u a l and co rpo ra t e a c t o r s are not 
v a r i a b l e s in a t h e o r y , they are i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a t h e o r y . 
I l l . Power in Fam i l i e s and Organ i za t i ons 
But t h i s does not matter to the argument at a l l . The more 
genera l c la im is tha t t h e o r i e s are not micro/macro, they are 
abs t rac t and g e n e r a l . Because they are abs t rac t and g e n e r a l , 
they are capable o f m u l t i p l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Some, though not 
a l l , abs t rac t t h e o r i e s are capable not on ly o f m u l t i p l e 
s i t u a t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but a l so to c o l l e c t i v e as we l l as 
i n d i v i d u a l ac tor i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 
Of the many examples of t h i s kind of m u l t i p l e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the one we w i l l look at here is the a p p l i c a t i o n 
of the exchange theo ry of power to con juga l power s t ruc tu r e s and 
i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The " r e source t h e o r y " o f con juga l 
power is a theo ry of the power-dependence r e l a t i o n s between two 
a c t o r s , a husband and a w i f e . The " r e sou r c e dependency t h e o r y " 
o f i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s a theo ry o f the 
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power-dependence r e l a t i o n s among a s i z e a b l e community of 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The two d i f f e r from each o ther in a number of 
concre t e d e t a i l s , some o f which d e r i v e from d i f f e r e n c e s in s c a l e . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , they have a common under ly ing t h e o r e t i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e . This t h e o r e t i c a l s t ruc tu r e has been a b s t r a c t l y 
formulated in va r i ous ways (Thibaut and K e l l e y , 1959; Emerson, 
1962, 1972a, 1972b; Blau, 1964) but, e s p e c i a l l y in the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e , i t has been Emerson's theo ry o f 
power-dependence r e l a t i o n s that has been most o f t e n a p p l i e d . 
A. Emerson's Theory of Power-Dependence R e l a t i o n s and 
Re la ted T h e o r e t i c a l Research 
Emerson's theo r y is formulated in terms of two a c t o r s , A and 
B, whose s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s e n t a i l t i e s o f mutual dependence 
(Emerson, 1962). I t is capable o f a p p l i c a t i o n , as Emerson no t es , 
to r e l a t i o n s between persons and persons, persons and groups, or 
groups and groups, p rov id ing the ac to rs s a t i s f y c o n d i t i o n s o f 
i n t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y , and are capable o f a c t i on as s i n g l e 
e n t i t i e s , o f " c h o i c e " among a l t e r n a t i v e s . "Power" i s a proper ty 
of a r e l a t i o n between A and B ( i . e . , not of e i t h e r A or B as 
i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r s ) d e f i n ed as the amount of r e s i s t a n c e on the 
par t of one a c t o r , say B, tha t can be overcome by ano ther , say A. 
Thus, i t i s p o t e n t i a l r a the r than actual power tha t the theory 
d e s c r i b e s . Power is founded on dependence, where "dependence" is 
a matter of the c o n t r o l by one ac tor of r e sources on which 
another depends f o r ach iev ing h is/her g o a l s . (A " r e s o u r c e " i s 
anything instrumenta l to at ta inment of a g o a l . ) Dependence 
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v a r i e s with two f a c t o r s , m o t i v a t i o n a l investment in g oa l s and the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a l t e r n a t i v e s : I t i s d i r e c t l y p r o p o r t i o n a l t o 
m o t i v a t i o n a l inves tment , but i n v e r s e l y p r opo r t i ona l t o 
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a l t e r n a t i v e r esources ou t s i d e the AB r e l a t i o n . 
Power is a f u n c t i o n of the net ba lance between B ' s dependence on 
A and A ' s on B. If dependence is asymmetr ic , power is 
"unba lanced . " Emerson assumes that unbalanced r e l a t i o n s are 
unstab le and tend towards ba l ance . They encourage the use of 
power by the more power fu l actor which in turn s e t s in motion 
processes by the l e s s power fu l to r e s t o r e ba l ance . There are 
four kinds of " b a l a n c i n g " o p e r a t i o n s : B may reduce m o t i v a t i o n a l 
investment in g o a l s mediated by A (w i thd raw ) ; gain a l t e r n a t i v e 
sources o f r e sources o ther than A (extend ne two rks ) ; i nc rease A ' s 
m o t i v a t i o n a l investment in g o a l s mediated by B ( s t a t u s 
emergence ) ; or deny to A a l t e r n a t i v e sources of r esources 
mediated by B ( c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n ) . Emerson's theo ry does not 
s p e c i f y c o n d i t i o n s under which one ra ther than the o ther occurs ; 
he says t h i s w i l l depend on c o n d i t i o n s p a r t i c u l a r to concre t e 
cases . 
Thus, the l o g i c a l s t ruc tu r e o f the theo ry c o n s i s t s o f two 
d e f i n i t i o n s , power and ba lance , and th r ee assumpt ions—that power 
is a f unc t i on of dependence; tha t dependence is an inc reas ing 
f u n c t i o n of the va lue of r e sources mediated by the o ther and a 
dec reas ing func t i on o f the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a l t e r n a t i v e s ; and that 
unbalanced power is uns tab l e , tending towards ba l ance . 
In a major res ta tement of the t h e o r y , r e f o rmula t ed in pure ly 
12 
behav i o r a l te rms, Emerson ( 1 972a) a r t i c u l a t e d i t s s t r u c t u r e more 
e x p l i c i t l y , l ead ing to both i t s r e f inement and ex t ens i on . The 
two most no tab l e r e f i n emen t s introduced unce r t a in t y i n t o the 
a n a l y s i s o f va lue and d i s t i n g u i s h e d n e g a t i v e from p o s i t i v e 
r e l a t i o n s between r e l a t i o n s . (Two exchange r e l a t i o n s are 
n e g a t i v e l y r e l a t e d i f exchange in one dec reases the va lue o f 
exchange in the o t h e r . They are p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d i f exchange 
in one i nc r eases the va lue o f exchange in the o t h e r . ) The l a t t e r 
r e f inement prepared the way f o r the most no tab l e ex t ens i on of the 
t h e o r y , to more complex networks of r e l a t i o n s (Emerson, 1972b; 
f u r th e r deve lped by Cook, 1977). Both the e a r l i e r and l a t e r 
f o rmula t i ons of the theo ry have g i ven r i s e to a subs t an t i a l body 
o f t h e o r e t i c a l r e s ea r ch , con f i rming the balance assumption 
(Emerson, 1964) and e s p e c i a l l y the i m p l i c a t i o n that s t r u c t u r a l 
p o s i t i o n determines the "use " o f power, which in behav i o ra l terms 
means asymmetries in the outcomes of exchange (Burgess and 
N i e l s o n , 1974; Michae ls and Wigg ins , 1976; S t o l t e and Emerson, 
1976). While the e f f e c t s o f p o s i t i o n were r e p e a t e d l y con f i rmed , 
a gap between p o t e n t i a l and actual power was found (Cook and 
Emerson, 1 978, 1 984 ) , e s p e c i a l l y when exchange is on ly i m p l i c i t l y 
bargained (Moire (1981b, 1985). This led to f u r th e r t h e o r e t i c a l 
e l a b o r a t i o n o f the process o f "use " o f power, l e f t i m p l i c i t i n 
Emerson, by Molm (1981a, b) and to theo ry and research on 
normat ive c o n s t r a i n t s on the use of power (Cook and Eroerson, 
1978, 1984o) . Meanwhile, the ex tens ion of the theo ry to complex 
networks was e m p i r i c a l l y t e s t ed by Cook (Cook et a l , 1983), who 
introduced the idea of a ne twork ' s dependence on a p o s i t i o n 
( " v u l n e r a b i l i t y , " as a determinant of power, and the theo ry was 
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f u r t h e r extended to c o n t r o l over n e g a t i v e as we l l as p o s i t i v e 
outcomes by Molm ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 
B. The Resource Theory of Conjugal Power and Re la ted 
App l i ed Research 
W o l f e ' s (1 959) theo ry of power and a u t h o r i t y in the f am i l y 
i s , l i k e Emerson's, a theo ry of a c t o r s A, B (who Wol fe a l so notes 
may be persons, o r g a n i z a t i o n s , or groups of any k ind) who are 
mutual ly in te rdependent and engaged in exchanges of goods and 
s e r v i c e s . W o l f e ' s theo ry precedes Emerson's by s e ve ra l y ea r s , 
both in f a c t growing from the even e a r l i e r " f i e l d " theo ry o f 
Lewin (1951, 335-336) which had a l r eady been used to fo rmulate 
the concept of "power" by Fes t inge r ( 1 953 ) . Although W o l f e ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n o f power i s more e x p l i c i t l y f i e l d - t h e o r e t i c , i t i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y , l i k e Emerson's, a r e s i s t a n c e concept and, l i k e 
Emerson's, i t d e f i n e s p o t e n t i a l ra ther than actual power. 
F i n a l l y , l i k e Emerson's, the c e n t r a l f a c t o r in power i s 
dependence on r e s o u r c e s , d e f i n ed as any c h a r a c t e r i s t i c or any 
possess ion of one ac to r instrumental to the g o a l s of and 
t r a n s f e r a b l e to another . Like Emerson's concept o f a r e sou r c e , 
W o l f e ' s i s h i g h l y g e n e r a l . Anything at a l l might be a r e s ou r c e , 
s ta tus as we l l as guns, l o v e as we l l as money, s k i l l s as we l l as 
possess i ons . 
Unl ike Emerson's t h e o r y , W o l f e ' s does not take i n t o account 
the a l t e r n a t i v e s a v a i l a b l e to the a c t o r s , and the r e is no balance 
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assumption, hence no ba lanc ing o p e r a t i o n s . The theo ry is app l i ed 
to f a m i l i e s by assuming tha t the ac to rs are a husband and a w i f e 
and that r e sources i nc lude both what each does f o r the c o l l e c t i v e 
g o a l s of the f a m i l y and what each does f o r the needs of the 
o t h e r . Thus, r e sources inc lude occupa t i on , income, educa t i on , 
c h i l d - r e a r i n g s k i l l s , domest ic s k i l l s , and s k i l l s i n f i n a n c i a l 
management. Fo l lowing f i e l d - t h e o r e t i c l o g i c i t i s assumed that 
who makes what d e c i s i o n s v a r i e s from " r e g i o n " to " r e g i o n " of the 
f a m i l y ' s space , but i t i s assumed that f i n a n c i a l d e c i s i o n s are 
bound to be important to the f a m i l y , and hence the more power fu l 
ac tor is more l i k e l y to make f i n a l d e c i s i o n s about them. As in 
Emerson, i t is the net ba lance of power tha t determines who has 
the most power, i . e . , the husband's r e sources minus the w i f e ' s 
r e sou r c e s . There w i l l be some p re - g i v en s t ruc tu r e of a u t h o r i t y , 
de r i v ed from c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n , but i t w i l l change i f i t i s not 
congruent with power/resources . 
This " r e s o u r c e " t h e o r y , though in many ways s i m i l a r to 
Emerson, is brought even c l o s e r to "exchange" theo ry by Heer 
( 1 9 6 3 ) ' Heer po in t s out c e r t a i n anomalies tha t r esource theory 
cannot e x p l a i n , f o r example tha t the w i f e ' s power dec reases as 
the number o f c h i l d r e n i n c r e a s e s . Heer c l a r i f i e s these anomalies 
by taking a l t e r n a t i v e s ou ts ide the f am i l y i n t o account . What 
v a r i e s as w i f e ' s power v a r i e s are her a l t e r n a t i v e s , both in terms 
of employment prospec ts and prospects f o r r emarr iage a f t e r 
d i v o r c e . 
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However, the Wol fe -Heer a p p l i c a t i o n o f power-dependence 
ideas to con juga l power s t i l l d i f f e r s from the more abs t r a c t 
theo ry of power-dependence in two s i g n i f i c a n t ways. On the one 
hand, the a p p l i c a t i o n is l e s s than the t h e o r y ; i t makes no use o 
the ba lance i d e a . On the o t h e r , i t is more than the t h e o r y ; i t 
i n t e g r a t e s i n t o i t a theo r y o f ( p r e - g i v e n ) a u t h o r i t y . I t i s i n 
f a c t the e f f e c t o f p r e - g i v e n a u t h o r i t y tha t has been the most 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s sue in subsequent r esearch grounded in the 
" r e s o u r c e " theo ry o f con juga l power. Cross -na t i ona l research a t 
f i r s t seemed to suggest s eve re c u l t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s on the 
e f f e c t s of r e sources on power (Rodman, 1967, 1972). However, 
these c o n s t r a i n t s seem themse lves to depend on the ex tent to 
which women c o n t r i b u t e to the process of product ion (Bossen, 
1 975; Rogers, 1 975 ) . (For r e v i ews of t h i s theo ry and r e l a t e d 
app l i ed r e s ea r ch , a t va r i ous s tages o f i t s deve lopment , see 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Lee, 1977; McDonald, 1980; and Scinowacz, 1987.) 
C. The Resource-Dependency Theory of I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
R e l a t i o n s and Re la t ed App l i ed Research 
Emerson's theo r y o f power-dependence r e l a t i o n s (1962) was 
f i r s t app l i ed to o r g a n i z a t i o n s by Thompson (1 967) . Even though 
Emerson had a l r eady abs t rac ted the theo ry from in t e rpe r sona l 
r e l a t i o n s , i t was not an obvious idea to apply a theo r y tha t at 
the t ime concerned the dyad AB to o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . 
But Thompson's "open-sys tems" framework led him to th ink of the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n as an ac to r in r e l a t i o n s of mutual dependence with 
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other o r g a n i z a t i o n s , which in turn led him to r e cogn i z e and s e i z e 
on the use fu lness of Emerson's theory f o r f o rmula t ing more 
e x p l i c i t hypotheses about the nature and consequences of t h i s 
dependence. But Thompson a lso thought of o r g a n i z a t i o n s as 
managing t h e i r env ironment , as ac t ing on it as we l l as being 
determined by i t . This made Emerson's t h e o r y , because o f i t s 
balance hypo thes i s , a p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t a b l e one f o r f o rmula t ing 
o r gan i za t i on - env i r onmen t exchanges as Thompson understood them. 
Although the language o f the a p p l i c a t i o n changes, r e f e r r i n g 
on l y to o r g a n i z a t i o n s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s , Thompson's use of 
Emerson corresponds c l o s e l y , p r o p o s i t i o n by p r o p o s i t i o n , with 
Emerson, 1 962. Dependence is d i r e c t l y p ropo r t i ona l to the 
" o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s need f o r r esources or per formances" but i n v e r s e l y 
p r opo r t i ona l to the a b i l i t y o f o ther e lements to prov ide them 
(Thompson, 1967, 30 ) . Power is the obverse of dependence. And 
Thompson makes e s p e c i a l l y prominent use of Emerson's ba lanc ing 
o p e r a t i o n s , which become the ways an o r g a n i z a t i o n manages i t s 
env i ronment. 
On the o ther hand, two ba lanc ing o p e r a t i o n s , withdrawal and 
s ta tus dynamics, d isappear from the ana l y s i s whi le s eve ra l ides 
are added. " Thompson has b u f f e r i n g mechanisms which p lay no r o l e 
in Emerson, and unce r t a in t y becomes the d r i v i n g f o r c e of the 
theo ry e a r l i e r in Thompson ( 1 967) than in Emerson ( 1 972a ) . But 
most important , Thompson f o l l o w s Cyret and March (1 963) in 
v iewing o r g a n i z a t i o n s as c o a l i t i o n s ra ther than un i t a r y a c t o r s . 
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In order to apply Emerson's t h e o r y , an o r g a n i z a t i o n must 
s a t i s f y the t h e o r y ' s c r i t e r i a o f a c t o rness , but w i th in the 
l i t e r a t u r e on o r g a n i z a t i o n s the r e is some doubt tha t 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s are un i t a r y a c t o r s . That they are c o a l i t i o n s , 
i n s t e a d , i m p l i e s i n c o n s i s t e n c y in p r e f e r e n c e s even i f they are 
capable at any g i ven ins t an t of ac t i on as a s i n g l e a c t o r . This 
problem, p o t e n t i a l l y f a t a l f o r use o f Emerson's t h e o r y , i s so lved 
by doubly app ly ing i t : i t e xp la ins not on l y i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s but a l so the power s t ruc tu r e o f c o a l i t i o n s wi th in the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n , which depends on c o n t r o l over r e sources tha t are 
c r i t i c a l , but s c a r c e , in managing unce r t a in t y 
Subsequent r esearch on the resource-dependency theo ry of 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s has deve loped along b a s i c a l l y t h r e e l i n e s . One 
branch of it has been concerned with mechanisms through which 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s manage t h e i r environment, such as mergers , 
a c q u i s i t i o n s , or boards o f d i r e c t o r s . (See P f e f f e r , 1 972a, 
1972b; P f e f f e r and Nowak, 1976; Usdiken, 1983.) The second has 
been concerned with how resources are a l l o c a t e d among 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s tha t form some kind of system of 
i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . (See P f e f f e r and Leong, 1 977; 
Provan, 1982; Provan et al , 1980.) The t h i r d has been concerned 
with the a l l o c a t i o n of r e sources to subunits w i th in an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . (See H i l l s and Mahoney, 1978; P f e f f e r and Moore, 
1980; P f e f f e r , Sa l anc ik , and L e b l e b i c i , 1976; Sa lanc ik and 
P f e f f e r , 1974.) Re fo rmula t i on o f Thompson's theo r y by P f e f f e r 
and Sa lanc ik (1978) s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e f i n e s the concept o f 
in terdependence and e xp l a in s the gap tha t e s p e c i a l l y the second 
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branch of t h i s r esearch had found between p o t e n t i a l and actual 
power by fo rmula t ing c ond i t i ons under which p o t e n t i a l power is 
enac t ed . (For r e v i ews o f t h i s r esearch see A l d r i c h , 1979; 
A ld r i ch and P f e f f e r , 1976; P f e f f e r , 1981. ) 
D. Conclusion 
I f we compare the resource theo ry of con juga l power to the 
resource-dependency theo r y o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t h e r e are c e r t a i n l y 
s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s . The ac to rs are persons in the f i r s t , 
groups in the second case . There are on l y two a c t o r s in the 
f i r s t , many in the second case . And the two a p p l i c a t i o n s d i f f e r 
not on ly in how they o p e r a t i o n a l i z e concepts but a l so in how they 
model the conc re t e phenomena with which they are concerned: The 
resource-dependency theo r y o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s uses ba lanc ing 
o p e r a t i o n s , the resource theo ry of con juga l power does not . And 
each combines power-dependence with o ther t h e o r i e s , though in the 
case o f the r esource theo ry o f con juga l power i t i s a theo ry o f 
f a m i l y a u t h o r i t y wh i l e in the case o f the resource-dependency 
theo r y o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s i t i s t h e o r i e s o f c o a l i t i o n s and o f 
uncer ta in env i ronments . But none of these d i f f e r e n c e s can 
d i s g u i s e the f a c t tha t the two a p p l i c a t i o n s have an under ly ing 
t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e in common, tha t o f the exchange theo ry o f 
power. 
Thus, l i k e the d i f f e r e n c e made by s i z e , l e v e l , and 
s t r u c t u r e , the d i f f e r e n c e between person and group is a n a l y t i c : 
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I t i s a d i f f e r e n c e in i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f one t h e o r y , not two 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t kinds o f t h e o r y . This conc lus ion i s not 
con f ined to the p a r t i c u l a r theory we have used to i l l u s t r a t e the 
argument. I t can be g e n e r a l i z e d to a l l i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s . 
Exchange theo r y i s on l y one kind o f i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r y . I t i s 
r easonab l e to ask what, then , l i m i t s the scope of the argument? 
In the next s e c t i on we c h a r a c t e r i z e in a more genera l way the 
kind o f t h e o r i e s to which the argument a p p l i e s . 
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IV . THE STRUCTURE OF INTERACTOR THEORIES 
I n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s are t h e o r i e s tha t d e s c r i b e the 
mechanisms or processes by which a c t o r s ac t in r e l a t i o n to other 
a c t o r s in s i t u a t i o n s of a c t i o n . Here we w i l l d e s c r i b e the 
under ly ing l o g i c o f such t h e o r i e s : Not a l l the t h e o r i e s in the 
present volume have a l l the e lements , p rocesses , and f e a t u r e s we 
d e s c r i b e . A number, f o r example, do not f u l l y d e s c r i b e how 
outcomes o f i n t e r a c t i o n are i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d or the events that 
a c t i v a t e the processes they d e s c r i b e , though the l o g i c o f 
i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s r e q u i r e s i t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , what we w i l l 
d e s c r i b e i s the s t r u c t u r e o f a f u l l - f l e d g e d i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r y , 
one that f u l l y e x p l o i t s the under ly ing l o g i c o f such t h e o r i e s . 
We w i l l d e s c r i b e them in terms of t h e i r e l ements , p r o c e s s e s , 
and f e a t u r e s . The e lements of an i n t e r a c t o r theo ry are systems 
o f a c t o r s in s i t u a t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e i r r e l a t i o n s and the 
nature of the s i t u a t i o n . The p rocesses , which are generated by 
and addressed to some prob lemat ic event or c o n d i t i o n , are both 
determined by and determine " s t a t e s " of these systems of 
r e l a t i o n s . The f e a t u r e s tha t d i s t i n g u i s h i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s 
have to do with the balance they s t r i k e between actor and 
s i t u a t i o n , agency and ex t e rna l causa t i on , s t r u c t u r e and a c t i o n . 
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A. Elements 
While the " a c t o r " seems the l o g i c a l s t a r t i n g po int f o r 
i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s , i t i s not the ac to r but the 
" a c t o r - i n - s i t u a t i o n " tha t i s t h e i r bas i c uni t o f a n a l y s i s . A 
" s i t u a t i o n " here r e f e r s to a s p e c i f i c se t o f c o n d i t i o n s tha t can 
g e n e r a t e , d e f i n e , and determine the course of a p rocess . 
( 1 ) S i t u a t i o n s . Because i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s are process 
t h e o r i e s , they r e q u i r e some s t a t e or event a c t i v a t i n g a p rocess , 
which i s par t o f the s i t u a t i o n that governs the p rocess . 
Processes can be a c t i v a t e d by almost any kind of prob lemat ic 
event o r c o n d i t i o n . In Emerson's power-dependence t h e o r y , i t i s 
the ba lance of power tha t a c t i v a t e s both the use of power and 
b a l a n c e - r e s t o r i n g o p e r a t i o n s . In Berger , F i s ek , and Norman's 
" E v o l u t i o n of Status Expec ta t i ons " ( ch . 5 ) i t is a goa l or a task 
to per form; in R idgeway 's " L e g i t i m a t i o n in In formal Status 
Orders" ( ch . 6 ) i t i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n by ex te rna l s ta tus o r d e r s ; 
in Sj6renson's " P r o c e s s e s of A l l o c a t i o n to Open and Closed 
P o s i t i o n s " ( ch . 10 ) , i t i s v a c a n c i e s ; i n Jasso ' s "The 
D i s t r i b u t i v e Jus t i c e Force" ( c h . 13) i t i s an ex t e rna l frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e tha t a c t i v a t e s r e w a r d - e x p e c t a t i o n s , the d i f f e r e n c e 
between actual and expected rewards tha t a c t i v a t e s responses to 
i n e q u i t y . 
Given such an event or c o n d i t i o n , a s i t u a t i o n is " d e f i n e d " 
and i t s course determined by th ree t ypes o f e lements : ( a ) the 
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immediate c o n d i t i o n s o f a c t i o n ; ( b ) 
o f the p rocess ; and ( c ) products o f 
ac to rs in the s i t u a t i o n . 
the l a r g e r s o c i a l framework 
past i n t e r a c t i o n o f the 
( a ) Cond i t i ons o f A c t i o n . S i t u a t i o n s f i r s t o f a l l c ons i s t 
o f the immediate c o n d i t i o n s o f a c t i o n . These inc lude the nature 
o f the g o a l , o r o f the d i s tu rbance , tha t a c t i v a t e s the p rocess ; 
the e co l o gy o f the a c t o r s ; and/or the amount o f i n f o rmat i on 
a v a i l a b l e to them f o r d e f i n i n g the s i t u a t i o n . In F o s c h i ' s 
"S ta tus C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , Standards, and A t t r i b u t i o n s " ( ch . 3 ) , 
Foddy and Smithson 's "Fuzzy Sets " ( c h . 4 ) , and Cohen and S i l v e r ' s 
"Group Stucture and In format ion Exchange" ( ch . 7 ) , the goa l is a 
d e c i s i o n . An important f e a t u r e of the s i t u a t i o n in each of these 
t h e o r i e s i s whether the d e c i s i o n i s i n d i v i d u a l o r c o l l e c t i v e . I f 
the d e c i s i o n s are i n d i v i d u a l , i t w i l l a l so matter how c e n t r a l i z e d 
o r d e c e n t r a l i z e d they a r e , the c r u c i a l v a r i a b l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g 
open and c losed labor markets in Sj6renson's vacancy compet i ton 
model ( ch . 10 ) . The a c t o r s may be few or many, t h e i r r e l a t i o n s 
d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t , r e sources may be more or l e s s t r a n s f e r a b l e , 
a l l v a r i a b l e s tha t p lay c e n t r a l r o l e s in Fararo and S k v o r e t z ' s 
"Biased Net Theory" ( c h . 9) and W i l i e r , Markovsky, and P a t t o n ' s 
"Networks o f Power" ( ch . 12 ) . A c o l l e c t i o n o f c o n d i t i o n s o f t h i s 
kind c o n s t i t u t e the immmediate c o n d i t i o n s of a c t i o n , though which 
c o n d i t i o n s matter v a r i e s from theo ry to t h e o r y . 
( b ) The S o c i a l Framework of the P r o c e s s . In any s i t u a t i o n 
in an i n t e r a c t o r theo r y the r e is some l a r g e r s o c i a l framework, 
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some p re - g i v en s t r u c t u r e d e r i v i n g from a l a r g e r s o c i a l system. 
Aga in , t h e r e i s wide v a r i a t i o n from theory to theo ry in the 
p a r t i c u l a r mix o f e lements c o n s t i t u t i n g t h i s framework. I t can 
inc lude anything from pure ly c u l t u r a l e lements (myths, symbols , 
r i t u a l s , v a l u e s , b e l i e f s , r u l e s ) t o pure l y s t r u c t u r a l e lements 
(networks o f t i e s , power-dependence r e l a t i o n s ) or any mix o f 
c u l t u r a l and s t r u c t u r a l e lements . In F o s c h i ' s "S tandards " 
( c h . 3 ) , Foddy and Smithson 's "Fuzzy Sets " ( c h . 4 ) , and Cohen and 
S i l v e r ' s " I n f o r m a t i o n Exchange" ( ch . 7 ) , the s ta tus 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s tha t d e f i n e the s i t u a t i o n are c a t e g o r i e s in the 
shared c u l t u r e of the a c t o r s . In Fararo and S k v o r e t z ' s "Biased 
Net Theory" ( c h . 9) and W i l i e r , Markovsky, and P a t t o n ' s "Networks 
o f Power" ( ch . 12) i t i s networks o f t i e s , and in Sri-enson's 
" P r o c e s s e s o f A l l o c a t i o n " ( c h . 10 ) , i t i s h i e r a r c h i e s o f 
p o s i t i o n s . In S t r y k e r ' s " I d e n t i t y Theory" ( ch . 2) and Samuel and 
Z e l d i t c h ' s " E x p e c t a t i o n s , Shared Awareness, and power" ( c h . 11) , 
i t is a mix of the two , networks and r o l e - e x p e c t a t i o n s in 
S t r y k e r ' s t h e o r y , power-dependence r e l a t i o n s and p r i o r 
assumptions about use of power and p r o b a b i l i t i e s of compliance in 
Samuel and Z e l d i t c h ' s . 
( c ) Products o f Past I n t e r a c t i o n . In add i t i on to a l a r g e r 
s o c i a l framework, t h e r e i s t y p i c a l l y a l s o some more p a r t i c u l a r , 
l o c a l knowledge tha t i s the product o f the past i n t e r a c t i o n o f 
the p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r s in the s i t u a t i o n . In Berger , F i s ek , and 
Norman's " E v o l u t i o n o f Status Expec ta t i ons " ( ch . 5 ) , e xpec ta t i on 
s t a t e s formed in prev ious i n t e r a c t i o n are t r a n s f e r r e d to and form 
part o f the i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n in a subsequent task i n t e r a c t i o n . 
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In Fararo and S k v o r e t z ' s "Biased Nets" ( ch . 9 ) , weak t i e s d e r i v e 
from the l a r g e r s o c i a l framework but some kinds of s t rong t i e s , 
such as f r i e n d s h i p , d e r i v e from the past i n t e r a c t i o n of 
p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r s . In Samuel and Z e l d i t c h ' s " E x p e c t a t i o n s , 
Shared Awareness, and Power" ( ch . 11 ) , e x p e c t a t i o n s about use of 
and compl iance with power d e r i v e in part from cu l tu ra l t r a d i t i o n 
(and thus a l a r g e r s o c i a l f ramework ) , but a lso in part from past-
i n t e r a c t i o n o f the p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r s in a power-dependence 
r e l a t i o n . In Jasso ' s " D i s t r i b u t i v e J u s t i c e " ( ch . 13 ) , 
e x p e c t a t i o n s d e r i v e from the l a r g e r s o c i a l framework, but j u s t i c e 
processes d e r i v e from d i f f e r e n c e s between e xpec t a t i ons and the 
actual d i s t r i b u t i o n o f rewards , which i s l o c a l . 
( 2 ) A c t o r s . The ac t o r s in such s i t u a t i o n s are conce ived 
qu i t e g e n e r a l l y as any un i t having the c a p a c i t y to c on t r o l some 
of the v a r i a t i o n in i t s own a c t i o n s . The fundamental p roper ty o f 
an ac to r is agency . Ac to rs make c h o i c e s , d e c i s i o n s , e v a l u a t i o n s ; 
they " o r i e n t " themse lves to s i t u a t i o n s and process in f o rmat i on 
about them; they a n t i c i p a t e , e x p e c t , have p o l i c i e s . The 
p a r t i c u l a r c a p a c i t i e s o f the actor again va ry from theo r y to 
t h e o r y . I t i s on l y the genera l no t ion o f agency tha t they have 
in common. In S t r y k e r ' s " I d e n t i t y Theory" ( c h . 2 ) , a c t o r s make 
"commitments" ( t h a t , in tu rn , d e r i v e from the s t ruc tu r e o f 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s and c o n t i n g e n c i e s c rea ted by age , gender , c l a s s , 
and other s o c i a l a r rangements ) . In F o s c h i ' s "S tandards" ( c h . 3) 
and Foddy and Smithson 's "Fuzzy Se t s " ( c h . 4 ) , they i n f e r 
a b i l i t i e s and make d e c i s i o n s . In W i l i e r , Markovsky, and P a t t o n ' s 
"Networks of Power" ( ch . 12 ) , they bid f o r goods. In S/irenson's 
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" P rocesses of A l l o c a t i o n , " a c t o r s do not s imply move, they choose 
to move, i n t o and out of p o s i t i o n s . 
Agency is a p roper ty t h a t groups may have as we l l as 
i n d i v i d u a l s . A l l that i s r equ i r ed i s tha t the group be 
c o r p o r a t e , in the l e g a l sense o f the term. T y p i c a l l y , t h i s means 
tha t the group has some means by which c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s are 
made and a c t i o n s as a c o l l e c t i v e are taken, as armies invade 
na t i ons , na t i ons tax c i t i z e n s , u n i v e r s i t i e s choose f a c u l t y and 
s tudents , h o s p i t a l s admit and r e l e a s e p a t i e n t s , unions make 
ba r ga ins , f i r m s s e l e c t product l i n e s , s e t p r i c e s , employ l a b o r , 
s t a t e s make l aws , enter i n t o t r e a t i e s , r a i s e armies. Network 
t h e o r i e s have been e s p e c i a l l y e x p l i c i t about t h i s : Thus, Fararo 
and Skvo re t z , in ch. 9, e x p l i c i t l y po int out tha t t h e i r "B iased 
Net Theory" a p p l i e s to mergers among o r g a n i z a t i o n s and t rade 
r e l a t i o n s among na t i ons as we l l as marr iages among persons . 
W i l i e r , Markovsky, and P a t t o n ' s "Networks of Power" ( c h . 12) 
e x p l i c i t l y a p p l i e s to groups as we l l as persons. 
Agency does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply i n t e n t i o n or awareness. 
Aga in , the r e is wide v a r i a t i o n from theo r y to theo ry in how aware 
the ac tor i s o f the processes tha t engage them, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n f o r m a t i o n - p r o c e s s i n g p rocesses , or in how intended the outcomes 
o f i n t e r a c t i v e p rocesses a r e . Many, l i k e S/6renson's " P r o c e s s e s 
o f A l l o c a t i o n " ( c h . 10 ) , are hidden-hand t h e o r i e s in which 
aggrega te outcomes are intended by no one, in which in f a c t , in 
"open" s t r u c t u r e s , the process compels a c t o r s even i f t h e i r 
i n t e n t i o n i s to escape the outcome. In a l l o f the " e x p e c t a t i o n 
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s t a t e " t h e o r i e s in the volume (such as F o s c h i ' s " S t anda rds , " 
Foddy and Smithson 's "Fuzzy S e t s , " or Berger , F i s ek , and Norman's 
" E v o l u t i o n o f Status" ( c h s . 3 - 5 ) ) , v e r y complex inputs o f i n i t i a l 
s ta tus in f o rmat i on are " p r o c e s s ed " by the a c t o r s but the a c t o r s 
are not assumed to be f u l l y or p a r t i a l l y aware o f the process 
and, i f asked to d e s c r i b e i t , cannot t e l l an i n t e r v i e w e r much 
about i t . But such hidden-hand and unconsc ious-process ing 
t h e o r i e s are n e v e r t h e l e s s i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s in the sense tha t 
the o r i e n t a t i o n s o f the a c t o r s are a fundamental aspect o f the 
under ly ing p rocess . 
( 3 ) R e l a t i o n s . Nor are a c t o r s n e c e s s a r i l y aware o f the 
pa t t e rn of r e l a t i o n s tha t form them in to systems. But, by 
d e f i n i t i o n , a l l i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s are made up o f m u l t i p l e 
a c t o r s , the ac to rs form systems, and the systems are d e s c r i b a b l e 
by the r e l a t i o n s among the a c t o r s . The minimum requ i red is tha t 
the a c t o r s are b e h a v i o r a l l y i n t e rdependen t , that two or more 
a c t o r s each a f f e c t the o t h e r , whether aware o f the f a c t or no t , 
as in Fararo and S k v o r e t z ' s "Biased Nets " ( ch . 9) or W i l i e r , 
Markovsky, and P a t t o n ' s "Networks of Power" ( c h . 12 ) . 
Furthermore, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t tha t t h i s in terdependence among 
a c t o r s be i n d i r e c t : That i s , what i s r equ i r ed f o r a "sys tem" i s 
tha t e ve ry ac to r be a t l e a s t i n d i r e c t l y connected to e ve ry o t h e r . 
But the i n t e r a c t o r concept of a "sys tem" does not r e q u i r e that 
each ac tor be d i r e c t l y connected to e ve ry o ther a c t o r , i t 
r e q u i r e s on l y tha t any one ac tor be d i r e c t l y connected to at 
l e a s t one o t h e r . Thus, R idgeway 's " L e g i t i m a t i o n in In formal 
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Status Orders" ( ch . 6) dea l s with a "sys tem" in which a l l 
r e l a t i o n s are d i r e c t , but i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s are not in genera l 
con f ined t o p a i r w i s e , d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s , and t h e o r i e s l i k e Fararo 
and S k v o r e t z ' s ( c h . 9 ) , Srirenson's ( c h . 10 ) , and W i l i e r , 
Markovsky, and P a t t o n ' s ( ch . 12) permit i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s , and 
t h e r e f o r e , a c t i o n at a d i s t a n c e . 
B. P rocesses 
A f u l l - f l e d g e d i n t e r a c t o r theo ry d e s c r i b e s mechanisms or 
processes by which the elements of the theo ry come to be r e l a t e d 
to each o t h e r . This r e q u i r e s tha t they exp l a in how a c t i v a t i n g 
c o n d i t i o n s , the s o c i a l framework, and products of past 
i n t e r a c t i o n are transformed in to d e f i n i t i o n s o f p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r s 
i n p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s ; i t r e q u i r e s tha t they exp la in the 
na ture , c o n d i t i o n s , and consequences o f p a r t i c u l a r processes o f 
a c t i o n ; and i t r e q u i r e s tha t they exp la in how the outcomes of 
such processes are transformed in t o e lements of the h i s t o r y and 
s o c i a l framework o f subsequent i n t e r a c t i o n . 
A l l t h i s i s t y p i c a l l y o rgan i zed around some kind o f " s t a t e " 
o f the system of a c t o r s in a g i ven s i t u a t i o n . S t a t e s , in part 
determined by p r e - g i v e n s t ruc tu r e and in par t by a c t i o n in the 
present s i t u a t i o n , are s i t u a t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i c , s t a b l e , r e l a t i o n a l 
s t r u c t u r e s . In t h e o r i e s l i k e F o s c h i ' s ( c h . 3 ) , Foddy and 
Smithson 's ( ch . 4 ) , or Cohen and S i l v e r ' s ( ch . 7 ) , the s t a t e s are 
pa t t e rns o f s t a tus r e l a t i o n s . I n S t r y k e r ' s " I d e n t i t y Theory" 
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( c h . 2 ) , they are s a l i e n c e h i e r a r c h i e s . In Fararo and S k v o r e t z ' s 
"B iased Nets " ( ch . 9 ) the s t a t e s are c o n s t i t u t e d out o f ways o f 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g a c t o r s , out o f the h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s , and f u n c t i o n s o f them. In Jasso ' s " D i s t r i b u t i v e 
J u s t i c e " ( c h . 13) , the s t a t e s are d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f ac tua l and 
expected rewards . 
These s t a t e s in genera l formulate in a p r e c i s e f ash ion the 
" d e f i n i t i o n o f the s i t u a t i o n . " Such d e f i n i t i o n s , though 
sometimes taken as g i v e n s , more t y p i c a l l y r e q u i r e s p e c i f i c 
t h e o r e t i c a l exp lana t i on because a c t i v i t a t i o n o f a process i s 
t y p i c a l l y s e l e c t i v e in the sense that a g i ven s o c i a l process uses 
some but not a l l o f the a v a i l a b l e inputs in t o the s i t u a t i o n . 
Thus, p a r t i c u l a r tasks make p a r t i c u l a r aspec ts o f the s o c i a l 
framework and p a r t i c u l a r aspec ts of past i n t e r a c t i o n r e l e v a n t in 
t h e o r i e s l i k e F o s c h i ' s ( c h . 3 ) , Foddy and Smithson 's ( c h . 4 ) , o r 
Cohen and S i l v e r ' s ( ch . 7 ) . P a r t i c u l a r ex t e rna l r e l a t i o n s make 
p a r t i c u l a r l e g i t i m a t i n g formulae r e l e v a n t in R idgeway 's 
" L e g i t i m a t i o n in In formal Status Orders" ( ch . 6 ) . Whether the 
system is open or c l osed determines the r o l e o f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
l i k e gender , r a c e , and educat iona l c r e d e n t i a l s in Sorenson 's 
" P r o c e s s e s o f A l l o c a t i o n " ( c h . 10 ) . 
The behav io r descr ibed by the processes o f i n t e r a c t o r 
t h e o r i e s are in the f i r s t i ns tance governed by these 
s t a t e s / r e l a t i o n s . At the same t ime , i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s 
t y p i c a l l y d e s c r i b e two-way p r o c e s s e s . That i s , s t a t e s / r e l a t i o n s 
not on l y determine b e h a v i o r , the behav ior they determine in turn 
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determines the s t a t e s / r e l a t i o n s o f the p rocesses . Thus, in 
Samuel and Z e l d i t c h ' s " E x p e c t a t i o n s , Shared Awareness, and Power" 
( c h . 11) , Expec ta t i ons about power shape both the use of and 
compl iance with power, but use and compliance in turn feed back 
in t o the process by which e xpec t a t i ons are c rea ted and 
ma in ta ined . In Fararo and S k v o r e t z ' s a n a l y s i s o f m o b i l i t y ( c h . 
9 ) , m o b i l i t y both a f f e c t s and i s a f f e c t e d by in t e r g roup 
r e l a t i o n s . This o f t e n l e a d s , a s i n e x p e c t a t i o n - s t a t e s t h e o r i e s 
l i k e chs. 3 , 5 , and 6, to exp lana t i ons o f s t a b i l i t y ( e . g . , 
s t a b i l i t y o f e x p e c t a t i o n s t a t e s ) i n terms o f s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g 
p rophec i es : The s t a t e o f the system of a c t o r s de termines 
b e h a v i o r s , such as i n f l u e n c e , power, or a l l o c a t i o n s o f rewards 
tha t in turn determine the s t a t e s govern ing the system, making 
them e f f e c t i v e l y s e l f - r e i n f o r c i n g . 
In g e n e r a l , the s o c i a l processes desc r ibed by an i n t e r a c t o r 
theo r y can be said to have some kind of outcome, such as 
c o a l i t i o n f o rma t i on , d i v i s i o n o f l a b o r , o r e l a b o r a t i o n o f r u l e s . 
Once a process has some outcome, an important ques t ion f o r an 
i n t e r a c t o r theo r y is whether, and under what c o n d i t i o n s , the 
outcome is t rans formed in to an input i n t o subsequent i n t e r a c t i o n . 
Berger , F i s ek , and Norman's " E v o l u t i o n of Status Expec ta t i ons " 
( c h . 5 ) i s e x p l i c i t l y addressed t o t h i s ques t i on . E s p e c i a l l y 
important i s the t r ans f o rma t i on o f outcomes in to e lements o f the 
s o c i a l framework, i . e . , t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . Fararo and 
Skvore tz ( 1984 ) , f o r example, have d e a l t a t l eng th with t h i s 
p r o c e s s , though not in t h e i r " Biased Net Theory" ( c h . 9 ) - Berger 
and Luckmann's well-known S o c i a l Const ruc t ion of R e a l i t y ( 1967 ) , 
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another i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r y , a l so dea l s with i t . I t i s d e a l t with 
from an exchange po in t o f v iew in S t o l t e ' s "Format ion of Jus t i c e 
Norms" ( S t o l t e , 1 987) . But in g e n e r a l , t h i s process is neg l e c t ed 
in the chapte rs in the present volume. We mention it here not 
because i t i s f r equent in the present volume but because the 
l o g i c o f a f u l l - f l e d g e d i n t e r a c t o r theo ry seems to us to r e q u i r e 
• A-l b . 
F i n a l l y , the f a c t tha t what i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s d e s c r i b e are 
p rocesses , and t h e r e f o r e imply some event or c ond i t i on a c t i v a t i n g 
them, a l s o i m p l i e s tha t the dura t i on of the process depends on 
whether the a c t i v a t i n g event or c o n d i t i o n cont inues or no t . For 
example, an outcome tha t accompl ishes a goal (ends in a d e c i s i o n 
or performance of a t ask ) or ends a d i s tu rbance ( e . g . , r e d r e s s e s 
an i n e q u i t y ) , a l s o d e a c t i v a t e s a p rocess . Exogenous f a c t o r s may 
a lso change the c o n d i t i o n s o f the p rocess , a l t e r i n g i t s course . 
Thus, R idgeway 's " L e g i t i m a t i o n o f In formal Status Orders" ( c h . 6 ) 
and Berger et a l ( c h . 5 ) take i n t o account the e f f e c t tha t 
e x t e rna l e va lua t i on o f performance has in a l t e r i n g s ta tus o r d e r s . 
The whole concept of the dura t i on of a p rocess , in f a c t , depends 
on i t s a c t i v a t i n g events and c ond i t i ons and may range from ve ry 
short to extended time p e r i ods . 
However, d e a c t i v a t i o n in i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s t y p i c a l l y ends 
on l y m a n i f e s t , observab l e f e a t u r e s o f a p rocess . The s t a t e s tha t 
govern the process are t y p i c a l l y assumed to have a l a t e n t 
e x i s t e n c e , in the sense tha t r e a c t i v a t i o n of the same process f o r 
the same a c t o r s a c t i v a t e s i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s tha t depend in part 
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on past h i s t o r y . Thus, in a theo ry l i k e the r esource theo ry of 
f am i l y power s t r u c t u r e , a f am i l y engaged in a dec is ion-making 
task may d e d i f f e r e n t i a t e i n , say , an e x p r e s s i v e phase, but 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e again in the same way when the dec is ion-making task 
r e c u r s . Almost no i n t e r a c t o r theo ry tha t we know about , and 
c e r t a i n l y none of the chapte rs in the present volume, assumes 
tha t a process beg ins _de novo eve ry t ime i t is r e a c t i v a t e d . 
C. Fea tures 
In exp l a in ing processes o f a c t i o n , i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s 
assume e x p l i c i t l y o r i m p l i c i t l y tha t no behav ior i s f u l l y 
exp la ined by (1 ) the b i o l o g i c a l or p sy cho l o g i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n s of 
i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r s , ( 2 ) the e x t e r n a l , env i ronmenta l , s t r u c t u r a l , 
or c u l t u r a l e lements of the s i t u a t i o n taken by themse l v es , or on 
the o ther hand, (3 ) by the process o f ac t i on i t s e l f . Emphasis 
here is on the word " f u l l y " : Only in spe c i a l cases do any of 
these f a c t o r s f u l l y account f o r , in and of themse l v es , how 
systems o f a c t o r s behave . This assumption r e f l e c t s th r e e 
d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s o f i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s : F i r s t , the r o l e i n 
them of s i t u a t i o n s ; second, the r o l e o f p r e - g i v en s t r u c t u r e ; and 
t h i r d , the r o l e o f a c t i o n . 
The " a c t o r - i n - t h e - s i t u a t i o n , " not the a c t o r , i s the bas i c 
uni t o f i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s . They are r e l a t i o n a l , s i t u a t i o n a l 
t h e o r i e s — b y c o n t r a s t , f o r example, wi th d i s p o s i t i o n a l t h e o r i e s , 
l i k e n a t i o n a l - c h a r a c t e r or c u l t u r e - o f - p o v e r t y t h e o r i e s . In an 
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i n t e r a c t o r theo ry the ac to r may we l l have any s t a t e d e s c r i b a b l e 
in the t h e o r y , no matter what the a c t o r ' s s t a t e in any o ther 
s i t u a t i o n : T y p i c a l l y , the r e i s no assumption o f t r a n s i t u a t i o n a l 
constancy i n the a c t o r ' s b e h a v i o r . This i s e s p e c i a l l y t rue o f 
t h e o r i e s l i k e Fararo and S k v o r e t z ' s ( ch . 9 ) , S/Srenson's ( ch . 10 ) , 
or W i l i e r , Markovsky, and P a t t o n ' s ( c h . 12 ) , in which a l l a c t o r s 
are assumed to have uniform a c t o r - l e v e l d i s p o s i t i o n s , m o t i v e s , or 
i n t e r e s t s s o tha t i t i s the s i t u a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y the l a r g e r 
s o c i a l framework, tha t accounts f o r any v a r i a t i o n in ac tor 
b e h a v i o r . ( T h i s i s t rue o f many other t h e o r i e s tha t th ink o f 
themse lves as " s t r u c t u r a l " ; they are " s t r u c t u r a l " because they 
deny t h a t they have any s p e c i a l assumptions about a c t o r s , 
although what they mean by t h i s is tha t they do not employ 
i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n exp la in ing b e h a v i o r . ) Theo r i e s l i k e 
F o s c h i ' s ( c h . 3 ) , Foddy and Smithson's ( ch . 4 ) , Berger , F i s ek , 
and Norman ( c h . 5 ) , or Cohen and S i l v e r ( c h . 7 ) , a l l 
e x p e c t a t i o n - s t a t e s t h e o r i e s o f s t a t u s - i n f l uence r e l a t i o n s , have a 
s im i l a r ac to r v a r i a b i l i t y because e x p e c t a t i o n s t a t e s are 
r e l a t i o n s tha t depend on the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the other as we l l 
a s the s e l f . Even S t r y k e r ' s t h eo r y o f i d e n t i t y ( c h . 2 ) , the 
whole purpose of which is to exp la in ac tor c o n s t a n c i e s , assumes 
" s i n g u l a r i t y " ( i . e . , constancy ) i s a v a r i a b l e tha t i s exp la ined 
by v a r i a t i o n s in s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s such as the s t a b i l i t y and 
o v e r l ap o f networks o f r e l a t i o n s . Actor and system, t o o , can 
vary from s i t u a t i o n t o s i t u a t i o n . In m u l t i - l e v e l t h e o r i e s , l i k e 
W i l i e r , Markovsky, and P a t t o n ' s ( c h . 12) , the i n t e r n a l power 
s t ruc tu r e of an o r g a n i z a t i o n can be descr ibed by r e l a t i o n s among 
departments , w h i l e the power s t r u c t u r e o f i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
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r e l a t i o n s can be desc r ibed by r e l a t i o n s among o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In 
the former the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s the system, i n the l a t t e r i t i s 
the a c t o r . The s i t u a t i o n a l r e l a t i v i t y o f a c t o r - s t a t e s thus 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s not on ly from d i s p o s i t i o n a l 
t h e o r i e s but a l so from any use o f conc re t e a c t o r s , l i k e small 
g roups , o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and n a t i o n - s t a t e s , as the " l e v e l s " o f 
s o c i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . No concre t e ac tor is in the same 
s i t u a t i o n a l l the t ime . The a n a l y t i c e lements t h a t make up the 
s i t u a t i o n are present on l y under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . The 
a c t o r - i n - s i t u a t i o n is t h e r e f o r e at once narrower and broader than 
any conc re t e a c t o r ; narrower because i t does not d e s c r i b e a whole 
a c t o r , broader because i t is made up of e lements in the s i t u a t i o n 
as we l l as in the a c t o r . Hence, the common p r a c t i c e of d i v i d i n g 
s o c i o l o g y up i n t o l e v e l s de f i ned by concre t e kinds o f a c t o r s 
makes no sense from an i n t e r a c t o r po int of v i e w . 
P re -g i v en s t ruc tu r e i s an e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e o f the s i t u a t i o n 
in an i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r y . However va r i ed the e lements which 
c o n s t i t u t e the s o c i a l framework, a l l the t h e o r i e s in the present 
volume, and i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s more g e n e r a l l y , presuppose some 
s t r u c t u r e . Extreme v a r i a n t s o f symbol ic i n t e r a c t i o n i s m , in which 
the f e a t u r e s o f a s o c i a l order are nego t i a t ed at e v e r y encounter 
( c f . Glaser and Strauss , 19xx; Denzin, 19xx) [REFS. MZ] are in 
t h i s sense not i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s , though they have most other 
f e a t u r e s o f such t h e o r i e s . 
On the o ther hand, wh i l e i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s a l l presuppose 
some p r e - g i v en s t r u c t u r e , they a lso pre suppose the agency of the 
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a c t o r , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t " a c t i o n " a lso has a r o l e in 
s o c i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n . This i s usua l l y accomplished by 
t r e a t i n g s t ruc tu re a s , except in s p e c i a l c a s e s , incomple t e . The 
v a l u e s , b e l i e f s , r u l e s , p r a c t i c e s , and procedures tha t c o n s t i t u t e 
a s o c i a l framework do not cover every event and c o n d i t i o n , are in 
any case not s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c t o f u l l y d e f i n e e v e r y 
p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , and even i f they were they cannot guarantee 
t h e i r own a p p l i c a t i o n to p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s . Consequent ly , t h e r e 
are f r e q u e n t l y c o n f l i c t s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o r e s o l v e i n 
p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s o r f e a t u r e s o f s t r u c t u r e t o e l a b o r a t e . 
Theor i es in which the r e is no ac t ion are no more i n t e r a c t o r 
t h e o r i e s than t h e o r i e s with no s t r u c t u r e . Thus, un l ike the o ther 
t h e o r i e s in t h i s volume, Turne r ' s "Mac ros t ruc tura l dynamics" ( c h . 
8) and Hannan's " O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Eco logy" ( c h . 14) are not 
i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s . They exp la in phenomena in terms of ex t e rna l 
c o n d i t i o n s ; the mechanism at work is s e l e c t i o n ; they presuppose 
ne i the r ac to rness nor a c t i o n . Theor i es l i k e A l thusse r , 1971, or 
Meyer et al , 1987, in which behav io r emanates from p r e - g i v en 
s t r u c t u r e , are a l so not i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s . Behavior sometimes 
may emanate from p r e - g i v en s t ruc tu r e even in i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s : 
There are many cases in which pa t t e rns become so r o u t i n i z e d tha t 
behav ior f o l l o w s on l y a w e l l - c l e a r e d path. But in i n t e r a c t o r 
t h e o r i e s t h i s occurs on ly in p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s , not in g e n e r a l . 
P o s s i b l y i t i s o f agency t h a t some m a c r o s o c i o l o g i s t s are 
th ink ing when they f e e l tha t i n t e r a c t o r exp lana t i ons o f macro-
phenomena are a " r e d u c t i o n to s o c i a l p s y cho l o g y . " Such 
exp lana t i ons are not r educ t i on in the t e chn i ca l sense (Nagel 
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1 952) . Nor is agency a matter of s c a l e , l e v e l , kind of a c t o r , 
o r , except a t the ex t reme, even o f the ex t en t o f 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . The micro/macro problem in t h i s sense is a 
d i spute over de termin ism, a m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l ra ther than a 
t e chn i ca l ques t i on . Nothing in the present paper advances 
argument e i t h e r pro or con with r e s p e c t to de termin ism. We have 
desc r ibed the common f e a t u r e s o f i n t e r a c t o r t h e o r i e s ; such 
t h e o r i e s do take a p o s i t i o n with r e s p e c t to agency/determinism; 
but we have not t r i e d to j u s t i f y t h i s p o s i t i o n . However, i f in 
f a c t the issue i s de termin ism, i t would be use fu l to r e cogn i z e 
what the i ssue i s ; to separate i t from the t e c h n i c a l , and more 
e a s i l y s o l v e d , ques t i on o f how t o model e f f e c t s o f s c a l e , l e v e l , 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n , and kind of a c t o r ; and to focus a t t e n t i o n 
e x p l i c i t l y on the m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s , i s sues such as 
de termin ism, ho l i sm, and s i t u a t i o n a l ism, instead of coding them 
"micro v s . macro . " 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Theo r i e s are n e i t h e r micro nor macro, they are abs t r a c t and 
g e n e r a l . I t i s on l y t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s tha t are 
micro or macro. S ca l e , l e v e l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i za i t o n , and nature 
of the actor a l l make a d i f f e r e n c e , but they are v a r i a b l e s in or 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f a t h e o r y , not d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e o r i e s . 
Some t h e o r i e s are capable of a p p l i c a t i o n to both mic ro - and 
m a c r o - s o c i o l o g y , some n o t . " I n t e r a c t o r " t h e o r i e s are capab le o f 
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a p p l i c a t i o n to bo th . Such t h e o r i e s d e s c r i b e processes o f a c t i on 
o f systems o f a c t o r s - i n - s i t u a t i o n s . They c h a r a c t e r i z e systems o f 
a c t o r s by the s t a t e s o f t h e i r r e l a t i o n s , and s i t u a t i o n s by the 
immediate c o n d i t i o n s o f a c t i o n , past h i s t o r y , and the l a r g e r 
s o c i a l framework. The s t a t e s of the system of r e l a t i o n s and the 
d e f i n i t i o n o f the s i t u a t i o n t o ge the r de t e rmine , and are 
determined by, the process o f a c t i o n . The main f e a t u r e s t h a t 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e the s t r a t e g y o f such t h e o r i e s from o ther s t r a t e g i e s 
o f t h eo r y c o n s t r u c t i o n are the agency o f the a c t o r , t h e i r 
s i t u a t i o n a l i sm, and t h e i r combinat ion of s t ruc tu re and a c t i o n : 
They are n e i t h e r a l l s t ruc tu r e nor a l l a c t i o n . 
I t i s po s s i b l e tha t the q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s between 
t h e o r i e s tha t have been a t t r i b u t e d to d i f f e r e n c e s between "m i c ro -
and macro-phenomena" are r e a l l y m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s 
between methodo log i ca l ho l i sm, i n d i v i d u a l i s m , and si t u a t i o n a l ism 
or between agency and determinism. But if holism and agency are 
what the "micro-macro" problem i s r e a l l y about i t i s e x p l i c i t l y 
on the m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l ques t i ons of holism and agency that we 
ought to focus the i s s u e s . As fa r as s c a l e , l e v e l , 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n , and nature of the actor are concerned the 
problems to s o l v e are p r a c t i c a l ques t i ons of how to model the 
e f f e c t s o f these f a c t o r s in any p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r y . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. We do not mean to o b j e c t to s yn thes i s e i t h e r of l e v e l s or in 
p r i n c i p a l . With r e s p e c t t o e i t h e r / o r f o rmu la t i ons o f ques t i ons 
l i k e actor/system o r s t r u c t u r e / a c t i o n , s y n t h e s i s i s the on l y 
use fu l s o l u t i o n . With r e spec t t o s t ruc tu r e " v e r s u s " a c t i o n , f o r 
example, i t seems e q u a l l y f r u i t l e s s t o argue tha t t h e r e i s no 
p r e - g i v en s t r u c t u r e , tha t a l l i n t e r a c t i o n i s n e g o t i a t e d ( c t . 
Denzin, 1987; Strauss et a l , 1963), and tha t t h e r e is no a c t i o n , 
tha t a l l behav io r does nothing but act out p r e - g i v en s t ruc turp 
( c t . Meyer e t a l , 1987)• 
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